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Abstract 
There is a debate in psychology and philosophy on the societal consequences of casting 
doubts about individuals’ belief in free will. Research suggests that experimentally reducing 
free will beliefs might affect how individuals evaluate others’ behavior. Past research has 
demonstrated that reduced free will beliefs decrease laypersons’ tendency towards retributive 
punishment. This finding has been used as an argument for the idea that promoting anti-free 
will viewpoints in the public media might have severe consequences for the legal system, 
because it may move judges towards softer retributive punishments. However, actual 
implications for the legal system can only be drawn by investigating professional judges. In 
the present research, we investigated whether judges (N = 87) are affected by reading anti-free 
will messages. The results demonstrate that although reading anti-free will texts reduces 
judges’ belief in free will, their recommended sentences are not influenced by their 
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Belief in free will is a cornerstone of our society and touches nearly everything we 
care about. From morality, politics, public policy, and intimate relationships, to punishing and 
rewarding behavior—“most of what is distinctly human about our life depends upon our 
viewing one another as autonomous persons, capable of free choice” (Harris, 2012, p. 1). 
Thus, not surprisingly, independent of culture (Sarkissian et al., 2010) and age (Nichols, 
2004), most people believe that they have free will (e.g., Baumeister, Masicampo, & DeWall, 
2009; Nahmias, Morris, Nadelhoffer, & Turner, 2005). 
However, whether free will actually exists is a longstanding controversy in philosophy 
(Dennett, 2015; Van Inwagen, 1983). Within the last decades cognitive neuroscientists have 
entered this debate by putting forward the idea that free will might be nothing more than an 
illusion (e.g., Crick, 1994; Harris, 2012; Wegner, 2002). Interestingly, such anti-free will 
viewpoints did not only become in vogue in academia (e.g., Greene & Cohen, 2004), but 
maybe even more so in the popular press (e.g., Chivers 2010; Griffin, 2016; Wolfe, 1997). 
This raises the question of whether it matters if people believe in free will or not.  
Philosophers have debated whether a world without free will would lead to negative or 
positive societal consequences. Some philosophers have put forward the notion that anti-free 
will viewpoints should be kept away from the public, because undermining people’s belief in 
free will may have catastrophic consequences, as people would no longer try to control their 
behavior and would start acting immorally (e.g., Smilansky, 2000, 2002). Other philosophers 
argue that not believing in free will would lead to overall positive effects, as people may 
abandon inadequate retribution-based morality and illusory beliefs in a just world (Caruso, 
2014; Greene & Cohen, 2004; Nadelhoffer, 2011).  
The question of whether the existence of free will has implications for our legal 
system has been strongly debated in the literature. Some philosophers and neuroscientists 
argue that because criminal behavior is caused by events beyond the offender’s control, such 
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as non-conscious events, genetic make-up, or environmental factors, nobody deserves to be 
punished (e.g., Greene & Cohen, 2004; Harris, 2012; Pereboom, 2006; Strawson, 2002). Yet 
other philosophers deny the general premise that moral responsibility for criminal behavior 
depends on the existence of free will. For example, Morse (2013) and Moore (2010) argue 
that the law as it stands permits offenders to be punished when they are capable of making 
choices. Thus, punishment should depend on the choice someone made, but not on its causes 
(see also Bok, 1998; Korsgaard, 1996). 
Without a doubt, this philosophical debate would benefit from psychological research 
experimentally testing the influence of challenging people’s belief in free will. In this respect, 
past research already indicates that weakening individuals’ belief in free will has several 
downstream social consequences. For example, reducing individuals’ belief in free will 
increases antisocial behavior, such as cheating (Vohs & Schooler, 2008), racism (Zhao, Liu, 
Zhang, Shi, & Huang, 2014), and aggressiveness towards others (Baumeister et al., 2009), 
and decreases prosocial behavior (Protzko, Ouimette, & Schooler, 2015). These effects might 
potentially be driven by the fact that free will beliefs increase perceived intentionality 
(Genschow, Rigoni, & Brass, 2017, 2019). 
In line with this notion, researchers found that reducing participants’ belief in free will 
decreases punishing behavior. For example, Shariff et al. (2014) asked participants to read a 
text from Francis Crick’s Astonishing Hypothesis (Crick, 1994). While half of the 
participants read a passage in which Francis Crick argued against the plausibility of free will, 
the other half of participants read a passage in which Francis Crick did not mention free will. 
Afterwards, participants read a fictional vignette involving an offender who beat a man to 
death and then recommended the length of the prison sentence that this offender should serve. 
Participants who read the anti-free will passage recommended lighter prison sentences than 
participants who read the control passage. The authors replicated this finding in two other 
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studies in which anti-free will belief was manipulated by exposing participants to newspaper 
articles or university lectures featuring neuroscience findings implying that human behavior is 
caused mechanistically. 
More recently, Martin, Rigoni, and Vohs (2017) analyzed data from the World Values 
Survey of 46 countries. The authors conceptually replicated Shariff et al.’s findings by 
demonstrating that free will beliefs predict support for criminal punishment. Going one step 
further, Genschow et al. (2017) investigated the underlying mechanisms of the link between 
free will beliefs and punishment. Their results indicate that when reducing belief in free will, 
individuals perceive others’ behavior as less strongly driven by internal forces (e.g., 
personality) than by external forces (e.g., situation). Moreover, the degree to which 
participants perceived a behavior as driven by internal versus external factors mediated the 
effect of free will beliefs on punishment.  
Based on these findings, researchers argued that promoting anti-free will viewpoints 
in the public media may have severe consequences for society and especially for the legal 
system (Genschow et al., 2017; Martin et al., 2017; Shariff et al., 2014). For example, Shariff 
et al. (2014) argued that these “findings suggest that merely presenting such a perspective 
[i.e., anti-free will messages] may move judges and jurors toward being less punitive and less 
retributive in general” (p. 1596). While such a perspective is reasonable based on previous 
evidence, the question arises as to whether professional judges are as susceptible to such anti-
free will messages as laypeople. Indeed, it might well be that their professional education 
prevents judges from being easily influenced by anti-free will messages. While studies with 
non-professionals are important to establish a potential link between disbelief in free will and 
retributive punishment, the implications for the legal system can only be judged by 
investigating law professionals. This of course implies compromising on some 
methodological aspects of the investigation such as sample size, because getting access to a 
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large sample of professional judges is challenging. 
To directly investigate the influence of disbelief in free will on punishment in law 
professionals, we tested whether judges are influenced in their sentences when being exposed 
to anti-free will messages. In our experiment we first manipulated disbelief in free will within 
professional judges. Afterwards, the judges recommended the length of the prison sentence 
that different criminal offenders should serve. At the end, we measured belief in free will as 
part of a manipulation check. The experiment was conducted according to the ethical rules 
presented in the General Ethical Protocol of the Faculty of Psychology and Educational 
Sciences at Ghent University.  
Method 
Open science statement 
We report all measures, conditions, data exclusions, and how we determined our 
sample size. Data and stimulus material are available on the Open Science Framework (OSF; 
https://osf.io/st9gh/?view_only=9cdd4a1289834899872053fe0f62dfba). 
Participants 
When assessing the influence of reading anti-free will messages on laypeople’s 
recommended sentences, Shariff et al. (2014) detected an average effect size of d = .64. To 
detect such an effect with 80% power and an alpha error probability of α = .05 (two-tailed), 
80 participants are needed. With this estimation in mind, we collected participants. In 
particular, the third author of this paper—an experienced professional judge—invited 
professional judges via different e-mailing lists to take part in an online study. Eventually, 91 
judges participated into the experiment. We discarded four judges who indicated that they had 
not read the text in which we manipulated belief in free will. The final sample consisted of 87 
judges (47 female, 37 male, 3 not reported). 84 judges reported German as their mother 
tongue (3 not reported). Age ranged from 29 to 67 (M = 50.58, SD = 8.89). On average the 
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judges had 16.39 years (SD = 11.07) experience in private law, 1.30 years (SD = 5.02) 
experience in administrative law and 2.83 years (SD = 5.66) experience in criminal law.  
Procedure 
At the beginning of the experiment, participants were informed about the general 
procedure of the experiment and then gave informed consent. Afterwards, we manipulated 
belief in free will in line with the procedure used by Shariff et al. (2014, Study 2), which is 
one of the most often used manipulations in the literature on free will beliefs. That is, 
participants read a passage of Francis Crick’s (1994) book “The Astonishing Hypothesis”. 
Participants in the anti-free will group read a text claiming that scientists now recognize that 
free will is an illusion. Participants in the control group read a passage from the same book. 
However, in this passage Francis Crick did not mention free will at all. We told participants to 
read the text carefully. To strengthen the manipulation, we ostensibly told participants that 
they had to answer some questions on the text at the end of the experiment. A recent meta-
analysis (Genschow et al., 2017) across all published and unpublished studies that have been 
conducted in our own research group supports the effectiveness of this procedure. 
After participants had read the text passage, they were presented with ten scenarios in 
which a person behaved criminally (e.g., strangle somebody to death, contract killing, killing 
somebody in a car accident, shooting somebody, stabbing somebody to death). To ensure the 
real-life character of the scenarios, we created them together with an actual professional judge 
(i.e., the third author of this paper). For each scenario, participants recommended the length 
(in years and months) of the prison sentence that an offender should serve.  
Afterwards, as a manipulation check, we measured participants’ belief in free will by 
letting participants fill in the German translation (Genschow et al., 2019) of the Free Will 
Inventory (FWI; Nadelhoffer, Shepard, Nahmias, Sripada, & Ross, 2014). The FWI includes 
15 items measuring the strength of the belief in free will and related constructs such as 
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dualism/non-reductionism and determinism. In line with previous research (e.g., Baumeister 
et al., 2009; Genschow et al., 2017; Goodyear et al., 2016; Lynn, Van Dessel, & Brass, 2013; 
Rigoni, Kühn, Gaudino, Sartori, & Brass, 2012; Rigoni, Pourtois, & Brass, 2015), we 
computed a belief in free will score by averaging the free will items with the dualism/non-
reductionism items and the reversed determinism items to obtain a global measure of how 
participants view their behavior as caused by their own free choice and independent from 
prior events and their biological makeup (Van Inwagen, 1983).  
At the end of the experiment, participants indicated basic demographics, were thanked 
and debriefed. 
Results 
Manipulation check  
Firstly, we analyzed whether the anti-free will manipulation had an effect on judges’ 
belief in free will assessed with the FWI (Nadelhoffer et al., 2014). A t-test for independent 
samples indicated that judges in the anti-free will group reported weaker belief in free will (M 
= 4.48, SD = 0.70) than judges in the control group (M = 4.86, SD = 0.65), t (85)= 2.67, p = 
.009, d = .56, 95% CI [.10, .67]1.  
Disbelief in free will and recommended sentences  
Secondly, we tested the effect of the anti-free will manipulation on recommended 
sentences. A t-test for independent samples yielded no significant result between judges who 
read the anti-free will text (Mmonths recommended sentences = 110.22, SD = 37.12) and judges who 
read the control text (Mmonths recommended sentences = 115.49, SD = 47.77), t (85)= 0.62, p = .540.  
Bayesian analyses 
The above-reported analysis indicates that although judges’ belief in free will can be reduced 
by letting them read a scientific text that argues against the plausibility of free will, the 
manipulation does not influence their recommended sentences. To confirm this interpretation, 
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we ran additional Bayesian statistics using JASP (Love et al., 2015) and tested evidence in 
favor of H0. We set the Cauchy prior width to the default prior of .707 and report BF01, which 
gives the ratio with which the null hypothesis is favored over the alternative hypothesis (i.e., a 
larger BF01 argues in favor of the null hypothesis; see Dienes, 2011, for an overview). The 
analysis yielded a BF01 = 2.64. A Bayes factor of 1 is conventionally considered as no 
evidence, a Bayes factor between 1 and 3 is considered as anecdotal evidence, and a Bayes 
factor between 3 and 10 is considered as moderate evidence (Andraszewicz et al., 2015; 
Jeffreys, 1961).  
Explorative analyses 
To further explore the obtained null finding, we ran a series of additional explorative 
analyses. In a first series of analyses we tested the correlation between belief in free will and 
recommended sentences. The correlation was not significant, r = .06, p = .6012. In an 
additional Bayesian analysis we tested the H0 for the same correlation by setting the Cauchy 
prior width to default priors of .707. The analysis yielded a BF01 = 4.68. 
In a second series of analyses, we explored the judges’ focus while they recommended 
the sentences. The German legal system differentiates between retributivism (called “Sühne”) 
and deterrence (called “Abschreckung”). Deterrence is further divided into specific deterrence 
(called “Spezialprävention”) and general deterrence (called “Generalprävention”). Specific 
deterrence is aimed at the actual dangerousness of the offender and thus aims to protect the 
general public from the perpetrator and to dissuade the offender, via punishment, from 
committing another offense. General deterrence aims to protect the general public by 
discouraging society from committing an act by raising awareness of what penalties may 
follow. At the end of our experiment, the judges rated on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very 
much) how strongly they had focused on retributivism, specific deterrence, and general 
deterrence while recommending the sentences. In multiple explorative analyses, we tested 
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whether judges’ focus on retributivism, general deterrence, or specific deterrence allows 
explaining our found null effects. 
First, a one-way ANOVA detected a weak linear trend indicating that when judges 
recommended the sentences, they focused most strongly on retributivism (M = 5.26, SD = 
1.60), less strongly on general deterrence (M = 5.03, SD = 1.57), and the least strongly on 
specific deterrence (M = 4.79, SD = 1.56), F(1, 85) = 3.17, p = .079, ηp² = .04. More 
interestingly, a 3 (focus: retributivism vs. general deterrence vs. specific deterrence) x 2 
(Manipulation: anti free will vs. control) ANOVA yielded a weak, but significant interaction, 
F(2, 83) = 3.21, p = .045, ηp² = .07. This indicates that judges in the anti-free will condition 
focused more strongly on retributivism (M = 5.49, SD = 1.50) than on general deterrence (M = 
4.69, SD = 1.81), t (44)= 2.19, p = .034, d = .48, 95% CI [.06, 1.54], and specific deterrence 
(M = 4.71, SD = 1.63), t (44)= 2.16, p = .036, d = .50, 95% CI [.05, 1.50]. The same 
comparisons were not significant for judges in the control condition, ts < 1.33, ps > .19.  
Third, we tested whether the different foci are related to judges’ recommended 
sentences. Correlational analyses indicate that only retributivism (r = .27, p = .012), but 
neither general deterrence (r = .03, p = .780), nor specific deterrence (r = -.04, p = .744) 
correlated with recommended sentences. 
Fourth, in separate regression analyses we tested whether judges’ focus on 
retributivism, general deterrence, or specific deterrence would moderate the effect of the free 
will belief manipulation on recommended sentences. To run these moderation analyses, we  z-
standardized all continuous variables (Aiken & West, 1996). The recommended sentences 
served as the dependent measure. As predictors, we entered the dummy-coded free will belief 
manipulation (1 = anti-free will, 0 = control), judges’ focus (either retributivism, general 
deterrence, or specific deterrence), and the interaction between these variables. The results 
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indicate that neither one of the foci moderated the effect of the free will belief manipulation 
on recommended sentences, bs < .36, ts < 1.61, ps > .11. 
General Discussion 
 Past research has indicated that letting laypeople read anti-free will viewpoints 
decreases their belief in free will and subsequently their tendency to retributively punish 
criminal offenders. This finding has been used as an argument for the idea that promoting 
anti-free will viewpoints in the public media might have severe consequences for the legal 
system, because it may move judges towards softer retributive punishments (Genschow et al., 
2017; Martin et al., 2017; Shariff et al., 2014). However, actual implications for the legal 
system can only be drawn by investigating professional judges. Thus, in the present paper we 
tested whether weakening belief in free will affects the degree to which professional judges 
would punish criminal offenders. The results of our experiment demonstrate that although 
reading an anti-free will text reduces judges’ belief in free will, they were not affected by 
their (manipulated) belief in free will when recommending sentences for criminal offenders.  
These results raise the question of why the judges’ judgments were not influenced by 
the anti-free will manipulation and their belief in free will. A potential explanation is that the 
judges’ professional education prevented them from being easily influenced by the anti-free 
will messages. That is, it might well be that in comparison to laypeople, when recommending 
sentences for criminal offenders, judges more strongly follow clear rules and relay their 
sentences based on previous published sentences. As a result, judges should be better 
calibrated and their judgments should less strongly deviate from each other.  
 These findings contribute to the debate on whether publishing anti-free will 
viewpoints in the popular press has positive or negative societal consequences. While some 
philosophers argued that disbelieving in free will leads to overall positive effects, as people 
would abandon inadequate retribution-based morality (Caruso, 2014; Greene & Cohen, 2004; 
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Nadelhoffer, 2011), other philosophers put forward that anti-free will viewpoints should be 
kept away from the public, because people would no longer control their behavior and start 
acting immorally (e.g., Smilansky, 2000, 2002). Similar to the latter notion, some 
psychologists highlighted the risk that anti-free will viewpoints could affect judges and jurors, 
because research has shown that reducing individuals’ belief in free will decreases the 
tendency to punish others (Genschow et al., 2017; Martin et al., 2017; Shariff et al., 2014). 
Our research suggests that this risk is not as high as has been suggested, because professional 
judges were not influenced by their belief in free will. 
Limitations and future directions 
 Besides these implications, we need to acknowledge several limitations that call for 
further investigations. First, one may argue that the effect of free will belief on judges’ 
recommended sentences depends on the legal system. That is, it could be that in countries 
where the legal system does not take into account retributivism, free will beliefs have no 
influence on judges’ sentences. However, it is important to note that in Germany, where we 
conducted the experiment, the legal system relies on a similar differentiation between 
retributivism and deterrence as the legal system in the US. Moreover, our explorative analyses 
suggest that although the anti-free will belief manipulation slightly increased judges’ focus on 
retributivism, this focus did not influence the relation between the free will belief 
manipulation and recommended sentences. Nevertheless, it might be that in countries in 
which the legal system is more strongly related to retributivism, one would find a relation 
between belief in free will and recommended sentences.  
 Second, it is quite possible that the failure to find an effect of the free will belief 
manipulation on recommended sentences is neither specific to the population of judges nor 
specific to recommending sentences, but reflects a general inefficacy of the manipulation. 
Indeed, several researchers recently reported difficulties in replicating some downstream 
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consequences of free will belief manipulations (Giner-Sorolla, Embley, & Johnson, 2016; 
Monroe, Brady, & Malle, 2017; Open Science Collaboration, 2015; Schooler, Nadelhoffer, 
Nahmias, & Vohs, 2014; Shariff & Vohs, 2014). For example, Nadelhoffer et al.’s (2019) 
results suggest that manipulating free will beliefs in a robust way is more difficult than has 
been implied by previous work, and that the proposed link with immoral behavior, such as 
cheating, might be similarly tenuous (see also Crone & Levy, 2019). In light of these failed 
replications, our research adds to the general call for replications of psychological findings 
(e.g., Lakens & Evers, 2014) and particularly to replications of findings in the field of free 
will beliefs. 
 Third, one might argue that our claims are based on a rather small sample size and 
may, thus, be difficult to interpret. Moreover, the Bayesian analyses suggest that evidence for 
H0 is not very strong. Thus, collecting more participants might actually allow detecting a 
significant effect. It is important to note, though, that assessing professionals, such as judges, 
is always a challenging task, and getting access to such a limited group of people is rather 
difficult. At the same time, we have to note that our sample size of nearly 100 judges is, 
compared to other research in the domain of free will beliefs, rather high. Indeed, based on 
power analyses, it would have allowed us to detect a medium-sized effect similar to the 
effects detected by Shariff et al. (2014). Thus, we would like to argue that even if one would 
find a significant effect within a larger sample of judges, the effect would be rather small and, 
thus, most likely negligible. Nevertheless, future research may aim to collect data from a 
larger sample of judges. Such research should then also test whether the effect of manipulated 
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Footnotes 
1Separate t-tests on the different subscales of the FWI indicated that the free will manipulation 
significantly affected the dualism subscale (Manti-free will = 3.93, SD = 1.33; Mcontrol = 4.67, SD = 
1.06), t (85)= 2.82, p = .006, d = .62, 95% CI [.22, 1.25], tendentially the determinism 
subscale (Manti-free will = 2.40, SD = 1.01; Mcontrol = 2.06, SD = 0.69), t (85)= 1.79, p = .078, d = 
.39, 95% CI [-.04, .19], and non-significantly the free will subscale (Manti-free will = 3.89, SD = 
1.04; Mcontrol = 3.98, SD = 1.19), t (85)= 0.39, p = .70. 
2When correlating the recommended sentences with the different subscales of the FWI, we 
found a marginal significant negative correlation between recommended sentences and the 
free will subscale, r = -.21, p = .051. The other subscales did not correlate with recommended 
sentences, rs < .17, ps > .120 
